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Long-Term Impacts of Individual Development Accounts  
on Homeownership among Baseline Renters:  
Follow-Up Evidence from a Randomized Experiment†
By Michal Grinstein-Weiss, Michael Sherraden, William G. Gale, 
William M. Rohe, Mark Schreiner, and Clinton Key*
We examine the long-term effects of a 1998–2003 randomized exper-
iment in Tulsa, Oklahoma with Individual Development Accounts 
that offered low-income households 2:1 matching funds for hous-
ing down payments. Prior work shows that, among households who 
rented in 1998, homeownership rates increased more through 2003 
in the treatment group than for controls. We show that control group 
renters caught up rapidly with the treatment group after the experi-
ment ended. As of 2009, the program had an economically small and 
statistically insignificant effect on homeownership rates, the num-
ber of years respondents owned homes, home equity, and foreclosure 
activity among baseline renters. (JEL D14, H75, R21, R31)
How can public policy help low-income people improve their long-term eco-nomic prospects? The United States has historically focused on a combina-
tion of publicly provided education, income maintenance, consumption support, and 
work incentives to help families maintain a minimum level of subsistence. In recent 
years, an additional approach has aimed to complement traditional policies by help-
ing low-income households save and accumulate wealth.1
1 Beyond the general goal of encouraging wealth accumulation, there are several motivations for encourag-
ing saving by low-income people. First, although many public policies already encourage asset accumulation, 
the vast preponderance of the benefits accrue to people in the top half of the income distribution (Seidman 2001; 
Woo, Schweke, and Buchholtz 2004). Second, compared to income-transfer approaches to poverty reduction, asset-
development approaches may have greater potential to foster sustainable economic development (McKernan and 
Sherraden 2008; Moser and Dani 2008). Third, while the acquisition of major assets (e.g., a house) can transform 
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Individual Development Accounts (IDAs) provide people with saving accounts in 
which withdrawals are matched if they are used for qualified purposes—for example, 
purchasing a home or furthering post-secondary education—and are designed to help 
low-income people accumulate wealth (Sherraden 1991). From 1999 through 2008, 
more than 50,000 IDAs were opened at 544 project sites through the federal Assets 
for Independence (AFI) Program, which provided grants to community-based orga-
nizations and local governments (US Department of Health and Human Services 
2010). Variants of IDAs are also in place or under consideration in numerous other 
countries, as are matched saving accounts for children (Loke and Sherraden 2009; 
Deshpande and Zimmerman 2010).
Previous experimental research on IDAs is limited. In learn$ave, a randomized 
IDA experiment in Canada starting in 2001, IDAs had positive impacts on post-
secondary education and small-business start-ups, two of the qualified uses of con-
tributions in that program (Leckie et al. 2010). The only randomized experiment 
with IDAs in the United States took place in Tulsa, OK starting in 1998. Baseline 
renters who were eligible to participate in that program had, at the end of the pro-
gram in 2003, a 7 percentage point higher homeownership rate compared to those 
in the control group. Among renters living in unsubsidized housing at baseline, the 
impact was 11 percentage points (Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2008; Mills et al. 2008).2
These results can be described as short-term impacts. Participants had three years 
to save in their IDAs, and another six months to use those savings for qualified pur-
poses. Longer-term analysis is important, however, for at least two reasons. First, 
longer-term effects are the ultimate goal of policy interventions designed to increase 
saving. Second, there is no experimental study on the long-term effects of IDAs on 
homeownership and, indeed, very little long-term experimental evidence regarding 
the efficacy of saving policies in general. Analysis of other (non-saving) policies 
has shown that long-term effects can be stronger or weaker than short-term effects.3
For IDAs, the long-term effects could exceed the short-term impacts for several 
reasons. Saving for a down payment may require more than three years, especially 
for low-income households. Alternatively, people might initially use the IDA to 
a household’s standard of living, the up-front financial cost may be out of reach for low-income people (Shapiro 
2004). Fourth, the process of accumulating assets may in itself alter people’s outlooks and choices, perhaps 
making them more future-oriented (Sherraden 2001; Oyserman and Destin 2010). Fifth, people need savings to 
weather temporary setbacks such as a spell of unemployment or an unexpected expense. Sixth, some existing fed-
eral policies—such as asset tests for eligibility for particular programs—may discourage wealth accumulation by 
low-income households. See also Wolff (2001); Hurst and Ziliak (2006); Oliver and Shapiro (2006); McKernan, 
Ratcliffe, and Nam (2007); and Scholz and Seshadri (2009).
2 Estimated homeownership effects for baseline homeowners (and estimated effects for the whole sample on 
other qualified uses of the withdrawals and on net worth) were imprecise and often inconsistent in sign (Mills et al. 
2008; Han, Grinstein-Weiss, and Sherraden 2009). In related experimental work, Engelhardt et al. (2010) use Tulsa 
IDA treatment status as an instrument for homeownership and find no net impact of homeownership on the provi-
sion of social capital. Using data from a Michigan experiment among low-income families with young children, 
Engelhardt et al. (2011) find significant offset of other educational saving in response to subsidies for college 
saving accounts. More broadly, Hotz, Imbens, and Klerman (2006) study short-run versus long-run experimental 
outcomes for alternative welfare-to-work training programs, which aim to promote human capital, a form of sav-
ing. Non-experimental analyses of IDAs (see, for example, Sherraden et al. 2005; Schreiner and Sherraden 2007; 
Mills et al. 2008; Rademacher et al. 2010; Sherraden and McBride 2010) are difficult to interpret because of sample 
selection issues.
3 See Almond and Currie (2011) for a discussion and review of long-term impacts of early childhood interven-
tions and Chetty et al. (2011) for a recent contribution to that literature.
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invest in education, in which case their homeownership rates may not be affected 
positively until that education translates into higher incomes several years after 
the IDA experiment. Likewise, the cumulative effects of financial education or the 
impacts of saving and increased wealth (as posited by Sherraden 1991) might spur 
members of the treatment group to lasting gains relative to the controls after the 
program ended in 2003.
On the other hand, the presence of strong intertemporal substitution patterns in 
response to the timing incentive embedded in the Tulsa IDA program could make 
the long-term effects smaller than the short-term effects. Specifically, treatment 
group members had incentives to purchase homes before the end of 2003 (to receive 
a 2:1 match) while control group members had incentives to delay home purchases 
until 2004 (when their release from the experiment allowed them to be eligible for a 
variety of home-buyer assistance programs offered by the community organization 
that implemented the experiment in Tulsa).
This paper examines the long-term effects of the Tulsa IDA program. Using data 
from a survey of treatment and control group members administered about ten years 
after the start of the experiment and about six years after the experiment ended, 
we re-examine the impact of the Tulsa IDA on homeownership rates and related 
issues, focusing on two groups: all households who rented at baseline (“all renters”) 
and households who rented at baseline and were living in unsubsidized housing 
(“unsubsidized renters”). Unsubsidized renters are a subset of all renters. These are 
the two groups that had the largest treatment effects on homeownership as of 2003, 
and, as renters at the beginning of the program, they are the sample members who 
would naturally have been most attracted to a program offering a 2:1 matching rate 
for down payments.4
We present several main findings. First, the Tulsa IDA program had an economi-
cally small and not statistically significant effect on the 2009 rate of homeowner-
ship. Second, the control group caught up to the treatment group very quickly after 
the experiment ended in 2003. These results, combined with earlier results showing 
positive and significant impacts on homeownership through 2003, are consistent with 
intertemporal substitution on the part of sample members in response to the timing 
incentives for home purchase embedded in the program. Third, despite the home-
ownership impact as of 2003, the Tulsa IDA had no economically or statistically 
significant impact on the number of years in which respondents reported owning a 
home during the 1998 –2009 period. Fourth, the Tulsa IDA had no economically or 
statistically significant impact as of 2009 on a variety of home-related outcomes, 
including house value, mortgage debt, the prevalence of fixed-rate versus variable-
rate loans, late payments, or foreclosure activity.
Several caveats are appropriate in interpreting these findings. First, the results 
imply that a three-year Tulsa IDA program had no lasting impact on ten-year home-
ownership patterns, but do not speak to the effects of a lifelong and permanent IDA 
program, which was originally proposed by Sherraden (1991). Second, while the 
sample members were effectively randomized into treatment and control groups, 
4 In Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2011) we show that the IDA had no significant impact on homeownership rates in 2009 
or the number of years in which a respondent reported owning a home from 1998 –2009 for baseline homeowners.
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several issues may affect the generalizability of the results. For example, sample 
members were not a random cross-section of low-income households. In particular, 
we show that between 1998 and 2009, homeownership rates increased dramatically 
for baseline renters in both the treatment and control groups. This result does not 
measure the impact of the Tulsa IDA program; rather, it speaks to the importance 
of having a randomized control group to account for the nonrandom selection of 
participants into the overall IDA experiment and for any location-specific influences 
on homeownership. Moreover, housing costs, the proportion of sub-prime loans, 
and both delinquency and foreclosure rates in Tulsa were lower than the respective 
national figures during the study period.
The analysis and results in this paper bear on several key discussions in econom-
ics. First, besides providing the first evidence on long-term effects of a three-year 
IDA program on homeownership, this is the first study of a randomized experiment 
(to our knowledge) to examine long-term effects of three-year matching subsidies 
on saving behavior, despite a large literature on the possible effects of billions of 
dollars of annual public tax expenditure for subsidies for private saving (Office 
of Management and Budget 2011). Second, the exogenous assignment of treatment 
status in the current paper creates a rare experiment on the impact on saving subsi-
dies, free of the biases that arise from non-random selection.5
Third, the magnitude of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in consump-
tion is a key question for a number of issues in economics (see, for example, Hall 
1988). While we cannot estimate the overall elasticity because only one compo-
nent of saving was subsidized in the study, our results nevertheless point to clear 
patterns of intertemporal substitution, given the timing incentives in the program. 
Fourth, the paper adds to the literature on the impact of matching contributions on 
saving behavior (see, for example, Duflo et al. 2006; Engelhardt and Kumar 2007; 
Saez 2009).
Fifth, although it is not exclusively a first-time home-buyers program, the Tulsa 
IDA program provided strong incentives for sample members to accumulate down 
payments. This subsidy created standard income and substitution effects and could 
be reflected in many different dimensions over which households can adjust behav-
ior in the face of a change in rate of return on saving for housing, for example, the 
timing of the purchase, the size of the house, and the loan-to-value ratio (Dietz and 
Haurin 2003). Engelhardt (1996, 1997) finds strong effects of a Canadian first-time 
home-buyer’s tax subsidy, but there is little evidence from the United States.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the experimental 
design. Section III describes the data and presents descriptive statistics. Section IV 
outlines our methods. Section V presents the empirical results. Section VI discusses 
issues relating to internal and external validity. Section VII concludes.
5 In addition to the literature cited in footnote 2, see Ashraf, Karlan, and Yin (2006), Duflo et al. (2006), and 
Saez (2009) for saving-related experiments and Engen, Gale, and Scholz (1996) and Poterba, Venti, and Wise 
(1996) for discussion of the problems created when selection is nonrandom.
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I. Experimental Design and Data Collection6
The IDA program in Tulsa, OK was administered by the Community Action 
Program of Tulsa County (CAPTC) as part of the American Dream Demonstration 
(ADD). ADD was a set of 14 philanthropically funded local IDA programs begun in 
the late 1990s. The Tulsa site was the only ADD program implemented as a random-
assignment experiment. Eligibility rules required applicants to be employed with 
household income below 150 percent of the federal poverty guideline.
Treatment group members had access to financial education, case management, 
and an IDA held at the Bank of Oklahoma. The account earned an interest rate of 
2 –3 percent.7 Participants could receive matches for up to $750 in deposits each year, 
with deposits in excess of $750 in a given year eligible to be matched in subsequent 
years. Participants could make matchable deposits for 36 months after opening the 
account. Unmatched withdrawals could be made at any time. Matched withdraw-
als could only be made six or more months after account opening. Withdrawals 
were matched at 2:1 rate for home purchase and 1:1 for home repair, small-business 
investment, post-secondary education, or retirement saving. A participant who made 
the maximum matchable deposit in all three years could accumulate $6,750 (plus 
interest) for a home purchase or $4,500 (plus interest) for other qualified uses. At 
the end of the program, participants could request to put any remaining IDA balance 
into a Roth IRA with a 1:1 match. If they did not, the funds remained in the account 
and were not matched.8
All sample members had to agree not to use other matched savings programs at 
CAPTC or any other financial homeownership assistance from CAPTC during the 
four-year study period. As a result, during the experimental period through 2003, 
treatment group members had access to the CAPTC IDA, while both control and 
treatment group members were restricted from other CAPTC housing-subsidy pro-
grams available to other low-income households. After 2003, treatment and control 
group members were again eligible for all CAPTC programs. All sample members 
could use CAPTC services for tax preparation, employment, education, child care, 
and so on during the experiment period. Control group members could also receive 
homeownership counseling from CAPTC and, if they requested it, they were pro-
vided with general financial information and referrals to other agencies in the Tulsa 
area that provided similar services. At these agencies, controls were free to seek any 
service for which they qualified, including financial assistance for homeownership.
Recruitment of participants for the experiment took place from October 1998 to 
December 1999. Program applicants were divided into 13 cohorts based on the tim-
ing of their applications. After they completed a baseline interview (wave-1), sam-
ple members were randomly assigned to either the treatment or the control group. 
6 See Mills et al. (2004) and Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2011) for more information on the data and survey methods.
7 There were no monthly maintenance fees, nor were there fees to open or withdraw from the account unless the 
respondent made more than three withdrawals in one year, which induced a $3 fee. Participants could also use direct 
deposit to transfer money automatically into the IDA.
8 The financial-education component included both general money-management training and asset-specific 
training. Program staff provided case management including assistance and consultation by phone or in-person, 
and sent out monthly deposit-reminder postcards. Matches for home purchase were paid to the vendor directly 
from the bank.
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There were a total of 1,103 baseline sample members. The wave-2 interview was 
conducted between May 2000 and August 2001. The wave-3 interview was con-
ducted between January and September 2003, about 48 months after random assign-
ment. Interviews were conducted using computer-assisted telephone and personal 
interviewing methods. Data from the first three interviews were used in the studies 
cited above.
For the current study, we report on a fourth wave of interviews that took place 
between August 2008 and March 2009, approximately ten years after random assign-
ment and about six years after the experiment ended. Interviews were conducted at 
an even pace for both the treatment and control groups, which is relevant given that 
the recent economic downturn developed and worsened during data collection. The 
interviews were primarily in-person for participants living in greater Tulsa, while 
respondents who lived elsewhere (19 percent of baseline renters and 21 percent of 
baseline unsubsidized renters) were interviewed by telephone. The primary inter-
view method was changed from telephone in earlier waves to personal interviews 
in the current wave in order to achieve higher response rates and to collect more 
complete data, especially on income and wealth (Biemer et al. 1991). The wave-4 
survey had the same format and content of the earlier surveys along with some new 
questions, as described in Section V.
II. Preliminary Data Issues
Table 1 reports sample sizes for these groups for each of the four interview waves. 
The wave-4 interviews included between 73 and 77 percent of wave-1 respondents, 
defined by rental and treatment status, and included interviews with 652 baseline rent-
ers, of whom 436 were unsubsidized. These response rates are about the same as at 
wave-3, despite the fact that the wave-4 interviews took place roughly six years later. 
The relatively high response rate is likely due in part to the change of survey method 
from telephone to personal interviews and intensive tracing efforts. Also, respondents 
were paid $50 to complete a wave-4 interview, up from $35 in the earlier waves.9
9 Among wave-3 respondents who were renters at baseline, 105 were not located in wave-4; 115 wave-4 respon-
dents who were renters at baseline did not participate in wave-3. Respondents in the last cohort of interviews in the 
baseline survey were the most difficult to reach and were provided $75 in incentives.
Table 1—Sample Size by Treatment Status and Wave
Wave-1 Wave-2 Wave-3 Wave-4
n n Percent n Percent n Percent
All baseline renters
 Control 429 358 83.4 324 75.5 332 77.4
 Treatment 434 363 83.6 318 73.3 320 73.7
 Total 863 721 83.5 642 74.4 652 75.6
Unsubsidized baseline renters
 Control 287 236 82.2 219 76.3 219 76.3
 Treatment 289 239 82.7 215 74.4 217 75.1
 Total 576 475 82.5 434 75.4 436 75.7
Note: Percent figures at each wave are calculated as a share of the number of sample members present at baseline.
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Table 2 summarizes the baseline characteristics of the 604 members of the wave-4 
sample for whom information on all covariates was available. The sample is balanced 
with respect to most of the variables. Relative to controls, treatment group members 
had slightly higher incomes, and were more likely to own bank accounts and to have 
children. Treatment group members were also more likely to be from last survey 
cohort. All of these variables are controlled for using multiple regression analysis.
The baseline characteristics of the wave-4 sample are similar to the baseline 
characteristics of the wave-3 sample examined in Grinstein-Weiss et al. (2008) and 
Mills et al. (2008). Among all renters, the average age is 34 years, median income 
is $1,352 per month, and more than two-thirds have at least “some college” experi-
ence. About 82 percent of the sample is female, 23 percent is married, 41 percent is 
Caucasian, and 82 percent own a bank account of some kind. As noted in Mills et al. 
(2008) and discussed further below, the sample is not representative of low-income 
households who would have been eligible for the Tulsa IDA: sample members have 
more education and are more likely to be single, female, and African-American than 
the population of IDA-eligible households.
Table 2— Baseline Characteristics of Wave-4 Treatment and Control Group Respondents
All baseline renters Unsubsidized baseline renters
Treatment Control Difference Treatment Control Difference
Live in unsubsidized housing 0.68 0.65 0.03 1.0 1.0 0.00
Age (mean) 34.2 34.3 − 0.1 34.9 34.5 0.5
Income (mean, monthly) 1,423 1,283 140** 1,526 1,338 188**
Total assets (mean) 5,555 4,891 664 6,385 5,781 604
Total debt (mean) 8,912 8,479 433 9,748 9,818 − 70
Education
 High school graduate or less 0.32 0.33 − 0.01 0.30 0.30 0.01
 Some college 0.41 0.42 − 0.01 0.41 0.42 − 0.02
 College degree or more 0.27 0.24 0.03 0.29 0.28 0.01
Female 0.81 0.84 − 0.03 0.76 0.77 − 0.01
Race (Caucasian) 0.39 0.43 − 0.04 0.47 0.53 − 0.06
Married 0.26 0.21 0.06 0.30 0.24 0.06
Presence of children in household 0.82 0.74 0.08** 0.77 0.67 0.11**
Bank account ownership 0.85 0.80 0.05* 0.87 0.84 0.03
Baseline survey cohort (cohort 13) 0.32 0.24 0.08** 0.31 0.21 0.10**
Have health insurance 0.60 0.54 0.06 0.58 0.56 0.02
Own a business 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.06 0.05 0.01
Own other property 0.03 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.02 0.01
Have retirement savings 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.09 − 0.01
Receive welfare payments 0.29 0.30 − 0.01 0.21 0.19 0.02
Own car 0.81 0.81 0.00 0.82 0.82 0.00
Satisfied with health 0.86 0.86 0.00 0.85 0.85 0.00
Satisfied with financial situation 0.64 0.60 0.04 0.64 0.65 − 0.01
Number of adults in household 0.45 0.43 0.01 0.57 0.50 0.07
Household goods ownership scale 2.32 2.27 0.05 2.43 2.35 0.08
Economic strain scale 0.54 0.55 − 0.01 0.56 0.56 0.00
Giving help in the community scale 0.57 0.54 0.02 0.57 0.53 0.04
Getting help in the community scale 0.36 0.37 − 0.01 0.36 0.36 − 0.01
Community involvement scale 0.39 0.39 − 0.01 0.38 0.39 − 0.02
Note: n = 604 for baseline renters (306 in the control group, 298 in the treatment group) and 403 for unsubsidized 
renters (199 in the control group, 204 in the treatment group).
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Although Table 2 shows that the wave-4 sample is balanced in terms of most 
baseline characteristics, we also examined attrition patterns from the wave-1 to the 
wave-4 interviews, regressing inclusion in the wave-4 interviews on the baseline 
characteristics listed in Table 2 and treatment status. Attrition was not significantly 
related to treatment status, but it was correlated with a few variables, including car 
ownership, a scale of household goods ownership, and receipt of help from the com-
munity. All of these variables are controlled for in the subsequent analysis and none 
raise concerns about systematically biased samples.
Table 3 presents data on intended IDA use by treatment group members who were 
interviewed at wave-4. About 89 percent of all renters in the treatment group opened 
an IDA. Among all renters who opened an IDA, 58 percent reported an intention to 
save for home purchase, 13 percent for home repair, and 17 percent for retirement. 
Average deposits were $1,695, not including matching funds. Fewer than half of all 
IDA holders made a matched withdrawal. Including the 11 percent of treatment group 
members who did not open an account, 66 percent of treatment group members never 
made a matched withdrawal.10 Similar results hold for unsubsidized renters.
III. Methodology
We test the effect of being assigned to the treatment group (that is, being an eligible 
applicant who is allowed to participate in the Tulsa IDA program) and thus provide 
“intent-to-treat” estimates.11 As described below, we use four approaches: unadjusted 
10 As discussed in Mills et al. (2008) in an examination of the full sample (including baseline homeowners), the 
likelihood of making a matched withdrawal was positively associated with having a bank account, having higher 
educational attainment, or being a homeowner at baseline and negatively associated with being African-American 
or female or having children.
11 The intent-to-treat estimates reported in this paper examine the average impact of exposure to the IDA. For 
some purposes, it is of interest to examine the impact on those who complied with the treatment protocols; this is 
called the effect of the treatment on the treated (TOT). It is given by TOT = ITT/p, where ITT is the intent-to-treat 
estimate and p is the probability that a treatment group member complied with the treatment. In the IDA experiment, 
compliance could be defined in different ways. For example, about 90 percent of the all-renter or unsubsidized-
renter treatment groups opened an IDA, and 84 percent of those groups contributed $100 or more (a measure that 
Schreiner, Clancy, and Sherraden (2002) define as a “saver”). TOT estimates are not reported separately below.
Table 3—Intended IDA Utilization by Wave-4 Account Holders
Reason for saving




Percentage with any 
matched withdrawal
All baseline renters
 Any 100.0 1,695 37.8
 Home purchase 57.9 1,417 16.2
 Home repair 13.2 2,158 88.6
 Education 6.4 1,848 52.9
 Retirement 17.3 2,233 65.2
 Business 5.3 1,654 42.9
Unsubsidized baseline renters
 Any 100.0 1,960 43.2
 Home purchase 55.7 1,713 21.4
 Home repair 16.8 2,111 87.1
 Education 5.4 1,894 60.0
 Retirement 17.3 2,572 62.5
 Business 4.9 2,159 55.6
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difference-in-differences estimates, ordinary least squares (regression-adjusted 
difference-in-difference estimates), and two forms of propensity-score analysis. The 
unadjusted difference-in-difference is given by
(1)  y 4i −  y 1i = α + β  T i +  ε i ,
where i indexes households,  y 4 is an outcome measure in wave-4,  y 1 is an outcome 
measure in wave-1, T takes the value 1 for treatment group members and 0 for control 
group members, and ε is an error term. In this specification, α measures the differ-
ence in outcomes from wave-1 to wave-4 for control members, α + β represents 
the difference in outcomes from waves 1 to 4 for the treatment group, and so β is the 
difference-in-differences estimate, that is, the amount by which the outcome changed 
over time for treatment group members net of any change in the outcome for control 
group members. Note also that because we examine the impact on homeownership 
using a sample of baseline renters,  y 1i is zero for all sample members.
Ordinary least squares estimates adjust the difference-in-differences for some 
observed household characteristics:
(2)  y 4i −  y 1i = α + β  T i + γ  X i +  ε i ,
where X is a vector of household characteristics observed at baseline. Controlling 
for X improves the efficiency of the estimates. (Probit analysis produced similar 
results and is not reported.) To examine how impacts differ across subgroups in the 
sample, we also report treatment effects interacted with a subset Z of the X vari-
ables, in regressions of the form
(3)  y 4i −  y 1i = α + β  T i + γ  X i + δ  Z i  T i +  ε i .
We further test the sensitivity of the results with propensity-score analysis, which 
uses the estimated conditional probability of group membership to rebalance sam-
ples on baseline characteristics. We employ propensity-score weighting (Hirano and 
Imbens 2001; Guo and Fraser 2010) and nearest-neighbor propensity score within-
caliper matching (Rosenbaum 2002). Both approaches begin with the estimation of 
the propensity score using logistic regression to predict the probability of member-
ship in the treatment group conditional on baseline household characteristics.12
The first approach—based on weighting the observations—converts the esti-
mated propensity score into a sampling weight that is applied to the OLS analysis. 
Consistent with our ITT approach, we estimate weights for the average treatment 
effect, apply these weights to the OLS model described above, and estimate the 
treatment effect net of any imbalance on observed baseline characteristics.
The second approach—based on matching one treatment and one control group 
member to each other—creates a new sample within the data so that equation (2) 
is estimated on treatment and control groups that are finely balanced on observed 
12 For the results reported in the text, we use all baseline covariates in the Appendix. The results, however, are 
insensitive to using subsets of the variables as shown in the tables.
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baseline characteristics. We use nearest-neighbor matching within a caliper, also 
called “greedy” matching. This approach relies on there being a large region of 
common support between treatment and control cases, where the odds of finding 
a close match on the propensity score are high. Fortunately, this condition is met 
in our data, so 79 percent of treatment cases are matchable among all renters and 
68 percent among unsubsidized renters. For the matching analysis, participants are 
randomly ordered and for each successive treated case, the closest control case 
(within 0.25 standard deviations of the estimated propensity score) is identified 
and the two are matched. We use 1:1 matching with no replacement. A new data-
set is constructed consisting only of matched treatment and control cases. Before 
analysis, the balance of this new sample between treatment and control is checked 
on relevant covariates. Balance is evaluated using chi-square tests and t-tests as 
appropriate, verifying that, after matching, the treatment and control groups do not 
differ significantly on these variables.
IV. Results
A. 2009 Homeownership rates
Table 4 presents the key findings for 2009 homeownership rates. As shown in 
the first panel, among all wave-1 renters, the wave-4 homeownership rate was 
44.0 percent for treatment group members and 43.1 percent for control group 
members. For unsubsidized renters, the 2009 homeownership rates are higher, 
48.5 percent for the treatment group and 48.2 percent for the control group. The 
strong increase in homeownership over the 1998 –2009 period among the control 
group reflects an underlying trend for this population, rather than an IDA effect, 
suggesting a sample highly motivated to save for a home and/or a positive local 
homeownership environment.
As shown in the second panel, the observed difference-in-difference estimates, 
reflecting the impact of the Tulsa IDA program, are economically small— 0.8 per-
centage points for all renters and 0.3 percentage points for unsubsidized renters—and 
Table 4—IDA Treatment Effects on Homeownership at Wave-4
All baseline renters Unsubsidized baseline renters
Wave-4 homeownership rates
 Treatment group 0.440 0.485







 Difference-in-differences 0.008 0.040 0.838 0.003 0.050 0.954
 OLS (Regression-adjusted
  difference-in-differences)
0.006 0.040 0.872 0.013 0.052 0.797
 Propensity score weighted 0.004 0.040 0.921 0.002 0.051 0.976
 Propensity score matched sample 0.026 0.044 0.551 0.009 0.058 0.875
Note: n = 604 for all baseline renters and n = 403 for unsubsidized baseline renters for all specifications except the 
matched regressions, where n = 476 and n = 276, respectively.
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not significantly different from zero.13 In contrast, the 2003 estimates were 7 per-
centage points ( p < 0.06) and 11 percentage points ( p < 0.02) for the two groups, 
respectively (Mills et al. 2008), implying that the significant impacts observed in 
2003 were no longer present by 2009.
The next three panels report OLS and propensity-score weighting and match-
ing methods. All of the estimated treatment effects are economically small: about 
1 percentage point in the OLS analysis, less than 1 percentage point for propensity-
score weighting, and about 0.9 –2.6 percentage points for propensity-score match-
ing analysis, and the estimates are not statistically significant.
Table 5 presents OLS estimates of the 2009 homeownership effects allowing 
the treatment effect to differ by subgroup of the sample (as in equation (3)). In 
both samples, estimated treatment effects are about 16–20 percentage points higher 
( p < 0.05 for all renters, p < 0.07 for unsubsidized renters) for households with 
incomes above the median than for those with incomes below the median. All other 
interaction effects are not significantly different from zero. These results mirror 
findings in Mills et al. (2008) for the period through 2003.
B. year-by-year Patterns
The analysis above uses “snapshot” questions that ask respondents about their 
current homeownership status at the time of the survey. Unlike other waves, how-
ever, the wave-4 interview also asks retrospective questions about homeownership. 
Specifically, in wave-4, respondents were asked to report on their homeownership 
history starting in 1998: what their status was at that time; when they bought a home; 
when they sold it; when they bought another home; when they sold it; and so on. 
Using this information, we construct a homeownership history for each respondent 
13 All p-values and references to statistical significance in this paper are based on two-tailed tests.
Table 5— IDA Treatment Effects on Homeownership at Wave-4:  
OLS Regressions with Interaction Effects
All baseline renters Unsubsidized baseline renters
Coefficient Standard error p-value Coefficient Standard error p-value
Treatment effect − 0.106 0.186 0.568 − 0.156 0.234 0.505
Treatment × higher income 0.167 0.084 0.046 0.200 0.107 0.063
Treatment × female 0.062 0.118 0.597 0.163 0.134 0.227
Treatment × Caucasian − 0.101 0.086 0.244 − 0.088 0.109 0.419
Treatment × married 0.112 0.108 0.299 0.087 0.134 0.517
Treatment × some college − 0.014 0.096 0.887 − 0.082 0.126 0.516
Treatment × college grad 0.120 0.106 0.256 − 0.063 0.134 0.636
Treatment × children − 0.050 0.102 0.624 − 0.147 0.124 0.235
Treatment × cohort 0.068 0.092 0.462 − 0.045 0.123 0.713
Treatment × banked − 0.041 0.105 0.697 0.055 0.142 0.697
Treatment × welfare 0.045 0.089 0.615 − 0.013 0.128 0.919
Treatment × car 0.009 0.105 0.933 0.082 0.137 0.548
Treatment × insurance 0.007 0.082 0.931 0.042 0.107 0.692
Note: n = 604 for all baseline renters and n = 403 for unsubsidized baseline renters.
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from 1998 to 2009, using these data to explore year-by-year changes in homeown-
ership, seeking insight about why the treatment effects for 2003 and 2009 differ.14
Figure 1 shows year-by-year homeownership rates for all baseline renters using 
the retrospective data.15 By the end of the program period in 2003, the treatment 
group’s increase in the homeownership rate is higher than that of the control group 
by 5.0 percentage points ( p < 0.21).16 After the experiment ends, however, the dif-
ference declines rapidly. In the first year after the experiment ended, from 2003 to 
2004, the homeownership rate did not change for all renters in the treatment group, 
but it rose by 5.0 percentage points for all renters in the control group. By 2005, 
the homeownership rates were identical, and they then remained very close for the 
two groups from 2006 until the end of the sample period.17
Similar results occur for unsubsidized renters, as shown in Figure 2. The treat-
ment and control groups had differences in homeownership rates of 7.0 percentage 
14 When there are conflicts between what people report retrospectively in 2009 about homeownership in earlier 
years and what people reported in those earlier years as a “snapshot,” we use the “snapshot” data. We have also 
performed the calculations ignoring the “snapshot” data and the main finding—that the impact on homeownership 
rates disappears after 2003 —is similar.
15 In each group, about 6 percent of baseline renters reported buying a home in the year of the baseline interview 
but after the interview date.
16 By way of comparison, the analogous finding from Mills et al. (2008), for all renters, is an estimated treatment 
effect of 6.9 percentage points with a p-value of 0.06.
17 The end of the sample period is 2008 for some households, 2009 for others. We combine the last observation 
for each household into the 2008 figure.
Figure 1. Yearly Homeownership Rates: All Baseline Renters
Notes: The graph shows the likelihood that a household owned a home at any point during the 
year. The data represent answers to retrospective questions. Differences between answers to 
retrospective questions and answers to snapshot questions in prior surveys are resolved in this 
graph in favor of the snapshot questions. Resolving the differences in favor of retrospective 
answers does not change the basic trends shown. For purposes of this graph, 1998 and 1999 
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points ( p < 0.10) in 2001, and 7.0 percentage points ( p < 0.14) in 2003.18 After 
the program ended, however, between 2003 and 2006, the homeownership rate 
was constant for the treatment group, while it rose by 7.0 percentage points in the 
control group.
These temporal patterns are consistent with intertemporal substitution by house-
holds in response to the incentives for the treatment group to accelerate home pur-
chases to 2003 or earlier, and the incentives for the control group to delay home 
purchases until after 2003.
C. Number of years of Homeownership
Even if the Tulsa IDA program did not affect the long-term homeownership rate, 
it could still have an impact by increasing the time that respondents spent as home-
owners. Using the retrospective data discussed above, we estimate the number of 
different years in which a respondent indicated that they owned a home during the 
ten-year period.19
As shown in the top row of Table 6, among all renters, the average number of 
years in which respondents owned a home was 3.17 for treatment group members 
18 The analogous finding from Mills et al. (2008), for all renters, is an estimated treatment effect of 10.8 percent-
age points in 2003 with a p-value of 0.019.
19 This is not a strict measure of the duration of time that a respondent owned a home; it is, rather, a count of the 
number of years in which a respondent indicated that they owned a home for at least some time because the wave-4 
survey only asked for the year of home purchase.
Figure 2. Yearly Homeownership Rates: Unsubsidized Baseline Renters
Notes: The graph shows the likelihood that a household owned a home at any point during the 
year. The data represent answers to retrospective questions. Differences between answers to 
retrospective questions and answers to snapshot questions in prior surveys are resolved in this 
graph in favor of the snapshot questions. Resolving the differences in favor of retrospective 
answers does not change the basic trends shown. For purposes of this graph, 1998 and 1999 
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and 3.09 for control group members, a difference that is both economically small 
and not significantly different from zero. Regression estimates from OLS and the 
two propensity scoring methods yield similar non-significant differences, with treat-
ment effect estimates between 0 and 0.3 years. Because the number of years of 
homeownership is bunched at zero —that is, for people who were renters throughout 
the entire 1998–2009 period—we also estimate these effects using a Tobit specifi-
cation. These point estimates are slightly higher but still economically small and 
statistically non-significant.20 Similar results apply to the sample of unsubsidized 
renters at baseline, also shown in the table. In summary, the Tulsa IDA had economi-
cally small and not statistically significant impact on the number of years in which 
a household reported owning a home through 2009.
Table 7 presents OLS and Tobit regressions for the same outcome as Table 6, but 
for the same subsamples and in the same format as in Table 5. The treatment effect 
is about one year longer for households above median income, and it is marginally 
significant for all renters ( p = 0.06) but not for unsubsidized renters in the Tobit 
regression. No other statistically significant effects are observed.
D. Other Dimensions of Homeownership
The Tulsa IDA program subsidized down payments on home purchases. As noted 
above and discussed in Dietz and Haurin (2003), these subsidies generate standard 
income and substitution effects that could have effects on other dimensions of home 
buying beyond the overall homeownership rate. In Table 8, we present treatment 
effects on home value, mortgage value, home equity, mortgage characteristics, 
20 We also assessed the effect of treatment assignment on the timing of entry into homeownership. Because the 
time to homeownership is measured in years (integers), we estimated the treatment effect with a discrete time logit 
hazard model. These estimates showed no significant effect of treatment for either group of renters.
Table 6—IDA Treatment Effects on the Number of Years  
in Which Respondents Owned a Home, 1998–2009
All baseline renters Unsubsidized baseline renters
Wave-4 mean duration of homeownership (years)
Treatment group 3.174 3.745
Control group 3.092 3.452
Treatment effects
OLS Tobit OLS Tobit
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Unweighted 0.076 0.278 0.100 0.504 0.313 0.367 0.401 0.581
Propensity score weighted 0.049 0.278 0.021 0.513 0.243 0.361 0.247 0.587
Propensity score matched 
 sample
0.267 0.309 0.462 0.543 0.229 0.426 0.262 0.651
Note: n = 604 for all baseline renters and n = 403 for unsubsidized baseline renters for all specifications except the 
matched regressions, where n = 476 and n = 276, respectively.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
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and loan repayment performance, using OLS estimates of the form in (2) for the 
sample of all renters. Similar results occurred for the sample of baseline renters. 
Online Appendix 1 describes the measurement of the outcome variables. There are 
Table 7—IDA Treatment Effects on the Number of Years  
in Which Respondents Owned a Home, 1998–2009










Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Treatment effect − 2.533* 1.427 − 2.541 1.809 − 4.446* 2.598 − 4.716 2.983
Treatment × higher income 0.880 0.608 1.038 0.785 2.014* 1.067 1.611 1.220
Treatment × female 0.501 0.890 1.540 1.010 0.488 1.496 2.372 1.571
Treatment × Caucasian − 0.567 0.626 − 0.418 0.788 − 1.159 1.084 − 0.656 1.223
Treatment × married 1.099 0.786 1.352 0.974 1.688 1.368 2.100 1.524
Treatment × some college 0.508 0.672 0.014 0.883 1.496 1.245 0.322 1.422
Treatment × college grad 0.644 0.772 − 1.090 1.006 1.688 1.319 − 1.630 1.559
Treatment × children − 0.151 0.749 − 0.704 0.909 0.138 1.384 − 0.923 1.480
Treatment × cohort − 0.047 0.650 − 0.876 0.901 − 0.064 1.168 − 1.361 1.421
Treatment × banked 0.566 0.739 0.885 1.026 1.094 1.538 2.034 1.876
Treatment × welfare 0.370 0.624 0.413 0.921 0.856 1.140 0.916 1.453
Treatment × car 0.588 0.718 0.838 0.980 0.503 1.332 1.361 1.583
Treatment × insurance 0.767 0.587 0.845 0.772 0.777 1.038 0.823 1.195
Note: n = 604 for all renters and n = 403 for unsubsidized renters.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
 ** Significant at the 5 percent level.
  * Significant at the 10 percent level.
Table 8— IDA Treatment Effects on Additional Homeownership and Mortgage Characteristics





 Wave-4 homeowners Home value at Wave-4 247 4,279 10,905 0.695 110,169
Home debt at Wave-4 246 5,958 9,797 0.544 76,094
Home equity at Wave-4 235 715 5,813 0.902 32,758
 Wave-4 mortgage holders
Have fixed interest rate? 224 − 0.014 0.038 0.711 0.95
Rate on primary mortgage 223 − 0.014 0.387 0.971 6.49
 Anyone who owned since Ever 30 days late? 232 − 0.022 0.063 0.729 0.34
  baseline Ever 90 days late? 230 0.058 0.046 0.207 0.08
Ever foreclosed on? 297 0.025 0.024 0.297 0.03
Unsubsidized baseline renters
 Wave-4 homeowners Home value at Wave-4 185 − 2,141 15,514 0.890 118,927
Home debt at Wave-4 183 197 12,597 0.988 83,661
Home equity at Wave-4 177 − 2,112 8,265 0.799 35,453
 Wave-4 mortgage holders
Have fixed interest rate? 167 − 0.025 0.046 0.587 0.95
Rate on primary mortgage 146 − 0.090 0.374 0.811 6.36
 Anyone who owned since Ever 30 days late? 174 0.007 0.070 0.918 0.33
  baseline Ever 90 days late? 172 0.079 0.056 0.160 0.08
Ever foreclosed on? 221 0.033 0.028 0.229 0.02
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no  substantive or statistically significant impacts of treatment on these outcomes as 
of wave-4. Treatment effects on home value, mortgage value, and home equity are 
of opposite sign for the two groups. Overall, homebuyers held an average of about 
$32,319 in home equity, with substantive and statistically similar amounts for those 
in the treatment and control groups.
Likewise, treatment group members did not have different types of mortgages 
(fixed versus adjustable rates) or face different interest rates than control group mem-
bers. About 95 percent of primary mortgages had fixed-rate terms, and the average 
loan carried an interest rate of about 6.5 percent. There are no statistically significant 
effects of the Tulsa IDA program on the likelihood that a current homeowner has 
ever been late on a mortgage payment, or has had a home go into foreclosure.
V. Discussion
A. Internal Validity
The internal validity of the experiment depends on how well it was implemented. 
We discuss two countervailing concerns: crossovers and participant use of other 
social and financial services. Each issue applies only to the period through 2003 
rather than the entire period through 2009.
A formal definition of a crossover is a control group member who, during the 
1998 to 2003 period, received some part of the treatment—that is, opened an IDA 
or attended financial-education classes at CAPTC. Crossovers could also be defined 
more expansively as control group members who, during the experimental period, 
received access to CAPTC’s homebuyer-assistance programs (other than the IDA) 
or who were able to open an IDA at some other non-CAPTC location.
Orr (1999) develops an intent-to-treat estimate adjusted for crossovers,  ITT o , 
that is calculated as  ITT o = ITT/(1 − c), where ITT is the intent-to-treat estimate, 
c is the proportion of the control group represented by crossovers, and where it is 
assumed that all treatment group members participate in the treatment.21 We gen-
eralize this formula to allow for less than 100 percent participation by members of 
the treatment group ( p < 1) in Tulsa IDAs, in which case the resulting adjustment 
is  ITT o = ITT × p/( p − c).22 Ten control group members reported participating in 
an IDA program during the experimental period and an additional 22 reported par-
ticipating in CAPTC’s down-payment assistance program, which was off limits to 
both control and treatment group members under the experiment protocol. Even if 
21 In the IDA experiment, crossovers are probably not a representative sample of controls; they are probably 
more highly motivated to save and so would have done better than the typical control even in the absence of 
crossover. As a result, dropping crossovers from the sample would undermine the balance between treatments and 
controls that is the purpose and chief benefit of random assignment.
22 The adjusted effect,  ITT o = p × (TOT ) + (1 − p) × 0 − c × (TOT ) − (1 − c) × 0. Collecting terms and 
noting that ITT = TOT/p yields the equation in the text. The formula in the text collapses to the formula given 
by Orr (1999) when p = 1. Both formulas are actually upper bounds on the adjustment for crossovers, since they 
assume that each crossover household received the full treatment. This assumption seems like an overstatement both 
because even those controls who opened an IDA are unlikely to have received all of the financial education and case 
management that treatment group members did and because (as discussed in the text below) more than half of the 
respondents who we are counting as crossovers did not open an IDA.
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all 32 members were considered crossovers, however, c is small (0.105 = 32/306), 
and the adjusted impact estimates are only slightly larger than the ITT estimates.23
A second issue works in the opposite direction from the crossover effect. As 
shown in Table 9, treatments were generally more likely than controls to use permit-
ted non-IDA social and financial services at CAPTC— especially tax-preparation 
services. In addition, although 7.6 percent of control group members used home-
buying assistance services for which they were not eligible, 26.3 percent of treat-
ment group members used such services. It is not clear whether these differences 
should be considered an outcome of the Tulsa IDA program, part of the IDA treat-
ment itself, or merely treatment group members misreporting permitted IDA-related 
home-buyer education as being part of another CAPTC program. The main point, 
though, is that treatment and control groups received different sets of benefits from 
CAPTC and that controls did not offset the difference in IDA eligibility by dispro-
portionately receiving other CAPTC services.
B. External Validity
Efforts to generalize the results estimated above for the Tulsa IDA experiment 
should account for several considerations. The first is the condition of housing mar-
kets in the United States. The experimental period —1998 through 2003 — and up 
until about 2007, featured favorable demographics, strong economic conditions, and 
innovations in mortgage markets—particularly sub-prime lending—that plausibly 
worked to increase the homeownership rate among low-income households (Bostic 
and Lee 2008; Herbert and Belsky 2008).
23 As an example of the magnitude of the adjustment, c = 0.105 and p (IDA participation) = 0.90 implies that 
TOT is 13 percent larger than ITT, so that if the ITT were 1 percentage point, the point estimate of the TOT would 
be 1.13 percentage points.
Table 9—Utilization of CAPTC Services, 1998–2003
n Treatment Control Difference p-value
All baseline renters
 Social programs 571 0.128 0.100 0.028 0.290
 Workforce programs 571 0.028 0.031 − 0.003 0.857
 Medical services 570 0.117 0.135 − 0.018 0.529
 Youth programs 570 0.142 0.090 0.052 0.051
 Small business programs 571 0.068 0.014 0.054 0.001
 Home buying programs 570 0.263 0.076 0.187 0.000
 Education services 571 0.032 0.038 − 0.006 0.701
 Tax preparation services 571 0.459 0.372 0.087 0.036
Unsubsidized baseline renters
 Social programs 380 0.094 0.074 0.020 0.479
 Workforce programs 380 0.016 0.016 0.000 0.990
 Medical services 379 0.126 0.101 0.025 0.450
 Youth programs 379 0.105 0.059 0.046 0.101
 Small business programs 380 0.073 0.005 0.068 0.001
 Home buying programs 379 0.283 0.080 0.203 0.000
 Education services 380 0.042 0.016 0.026 0.130
 Tax preparation services 380 0.455 0.386 0.069 0.172
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A second consideration is the housing market in Tulsa. Housing costs in the 
Tulsa area were substantially below the national average during the experiment, 
perhaps making homeownership relatively affordable for low-income households in 
the area.24 Moreover, while subprime lending became more prevalent in the United 
States during the study period, the Tulsa area had a lower share of subprime loans, 
and lower rates of delinquency and foreclosure compared to the national average 
(National Association of Realtors 2009).
A third consideration is the availability of other local homeownership assistance. 
Tulsa may have had more affordable-housing programs during the study period than 
other locations. For example, Housing Partners of Tulsa offered down-payment and 
closing-cost assistance equal to 5 percent of the purchase price upon completion of 
a home buyer education program (Tulsa Housing Authority 2008). No matched sav-
ings were required to receive those funds.
A fourth consideration has to do with program design. The Tulsa IDA program 
was among the first IDA programs in the country when it started in 1998. Based on 
field experience and other factors, many current IDA programs are structured differ-
ently in terms of match rates, maximum available matches, duration, qualified uses 
of the funds, and so on. For example, most IDA programs today funded through the 
federal AFI program offer a five-year saving period (US Department of Health and 
Human Services 2010).
Fifth, although the sample in Tulsa may well be representative of the population 
most interested in IDAs, it was not a representative sample of all IDA-eligible house-
holds. Mills et al. (2008) find substantial differences between Tulsa IDA respon-
dents and IDA-eligible samples drawn from the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances 
and from 2000 Census data for the greater Tulsa area. Study participants were more 
educated, and they were more likely to be single, female, and African-American 
than IDA-eligible households. The impact of IDA program participation on a more 
representative sample of eligible participants may vary from those reported here, 
although our subgroup analysis suggests that, other than income, there were no sta-
tistically significant differences within subgroups.
To provide additional evidence on this, we drew a sample from the 1999 Panel 
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) based on renters who matched the eligibility 
rules for the Tulsa IDA. The time elapsed between the 1999 and 2007 waves of the 
PSID is roughly comparable to the period between the wave-1 and wave-4 surveys 
described above. Table 10 shows that the homeownership rate increased to 39 per-
cent in the PSID sample in 2007, compared to 43 percent among Tulsa control group 
members in 2009. This difference is not statistically significant, but one potential 
concern with this comparison is that even after selecting for IDA eligibility in 1999, 
the PSID sample was substantially different from the ADD sample on demographic 
and financial characteristics. Reweighting the samples using propensity scores, the 
homeownership rate for the Tulsa control group in 2009 is more than 10 percentage 
points ( p < 0.05) higher than for the PSID sample in 2007. Even larger differences 
24 The median home price (in current dollars) in Tulsa County was $60,300 in 1990, $91,700 in 2001, and 
$120,000 in 2007 (Ard and Puckett 2002; American Community Survey 2007). In 2009, the median home price 
to income ratio for Tulsa County was 2.8, compared to 6.2 for the nation (National Association of Realtors 2009).
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occur for the two samples of unsubsidized renters, where the Tulsa control group’s 
homeownership rate is almost 15 percentage points higher ( p < 0.02).
These results suggest that controls in the Tulsa experiment either were more 
motivated to purchase homes or faced more favorable housing-market and housing-
assistance conditions than the general US population with similar observed charac-
teristics. This also demonstrates the importance of using a randomized evaluation to 
study the effects of IDAs, rather than drawing on a nonrandomized sample of obser-
vationally equivalent households that did not self-select into an IDA experiment.
VI. Conclusion
Based on a longitudinal random-assignment design, this paper presents evidence 
on the 10-year impacts of an IDA program on homeownership. We find that the Tulsa 
IDA program had an economically small and not statistically significant impact on 
homeownership as of 2009. Earlier findings (Grinstein-Weiss et al. 2008; Mills et 
al. 2008) show a statistically significant programmatic effect on homeownership 
rates as of 2003. However, we show that the estimated program impact as of 2003 
disappears rapidly after the program ended. Homeownership rates in the treatment 
group stayed flat until homeownership rates in the control group caught up. Finally, 
we show that the program had an economically small and not statistically significant 
effect on the number of years in which respondents reported owning a home during 
the 1998 –2009 period and on other measures of home buying activity, such as home 
equity, the mortgage interest rate, or default and foreclosure activity.
These results provide new evidence that relates to several key issues in econom-
ics, including the effects of incentives and matching contributions for saving, the 
effects of homebuyer subsidy programs, and the extent of intertemporal substitu-
tion in consumption. In particular, a plausible explanation for the pattern of results 
found—a positive effect through 2003 but no effect after ten years—is that house-
holds substituted home purchases intertemporally in response to the incentives in the 
Tulsa IDA experiment. Treatment group members had incentives to accelerate home 
purchases before 2003 in order to claim a 2:1 match for down payments. Control 
group members had incentives to postpone purchases until the experiment ended in 
2003, at which point they could take full advantage of the homeownership programs 
at CAPTC, including financial assistance for down payment and closing costs.
Table 10—Change in Homeownership Rates: Tulsa Control Group  
Compared to PSID IDA-Eligible Sample
All baseline renters Unsubsidized baseline renters
Tulsa
control
group PSID Difference p-value
Tulsa 
control  
group PSID Difference p-value
Unadjusted 0.430 0.390 0.040 0.243 0.480 0.403 0.077 0.079
With propensity score
 weighting
0.457 0.350 0.107 0.044 0.497 0.349 0.148 0.020
Note: n = 307 for all baseline renters in the Tulsa control group, n = 623 for all baseline renters in the PSID sam-
ple, n = 200 for unsubsidized baseline renters in the Tulsa control group, and n = 362 for unsubsidized baseline 
renters in the PSID sample.
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It is worth emphasizing that the analysis addresses the impact of a three-year IDA 
program, rather than a permanent IDA, as proposed originally by Sherraden (1991). 
Future research should focus on several issues. First, while our analysis focuses 
on baseline renters and the impact on homeownership, the long-term effects of the 
Tulsa IDA for all sample members and on other qualified uses of savings—home 
repair, small business, post-secondary education, or saving for retirement—as well 
as other outcomes, such as net worth, are of interest.
Second, along with the potential benefits of IDAs, additional information on 
the costs of IDAs in various contexts should be pursued. Schreiner (2006), for 
example, calculates the administrative costs of the Tulsa IDA to be about $1,949 
per participant.
Third, because IDAs are made up of a bundle of services, it would be valuable 
for both policy and research reasons to understand the channels through IDAs 
may affect behavior and well-being. For example, experimental evidence from the 
Canadian learn$ave program indicates that financial features of the program (con-
tribution level, matching rate, etc.) affected the positive education impacts, but that 
the addition of financial education services did not (Leckie et al. 2010).
Fourth, a question that may be of interest is why participants in the Tulsa IDA 
experiment—treatment and control group members alike—increased their home-
ownership rates by more than a random sample of low-income households (as evi-
denced by the comparison with respondents from the PSID). As noted above, some 
combination of different motivations for saving, different local housing markets, 
and different exposure to assistance and education programs could have played 
important roles.
Appendix: Definitions of Variables
Homeownership is measured in wave-1 and wave-4 with a question that asks all 
respondents “Do you own or rent the home you currently live in?” We assign a 1 to 
those indicating they own and a 0 to those who rent and to the 51 respondents in the 
wave-4 survey who indicate that they are neither owners nor renters.
All other variables are measured as of the baseline (wave-1) survey only, and 
most are self-explanatory and conventional. Age of the household head is measured 
with an indicator variable for age equal to or above the sample median of 35 years. 
Total monthly gross household income from all sources is calculated as the sum of 
income from employment, public assistance, public insurance, informal sources, 
and other sources such as investment or business income. The variable was dichot-
omized to limit the influence of outliers, and included in models as an indicator 
variable for equal to or above the sample median income (about $15,384 annually 
among all renters); the sample median was recalculated for models with different 
samples such as the analyses of baseline unsubsidized renters.
Marital status was collapsed into two groups, married and not married, the latter 
including those who are single, separated, divorced, or widowed. The highest level 
of education that participants achieved at the time of the baseline survey is catego-
rized into three groups: less than high school or completed high school, attended 
some college, and graduated from college (the last including respondents who 
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received associate’s degrees). To limit the effect of outliers, we scale total assets 
and debt by mean monthly income at baseline for the wave-4 respondents and use 
categories. We also include an indicator variable for any respondent with any miss-
ing asset or debt data.
The health measure asks respondents to compare their own health to other people 
their age on a 5-point scale. The top two categories of relative health are collapsed 
together into a positive response in the dichotomous measure. The financial satis-
faction question asks respondents if they are satisfied on a 4-point scale. The top 
two categories are combined into the positive response.
Finally, we include a set of scales created from multiple survey items. The eco-
nomic strain scale is adapted from the family stress model (Conger et al. 2002) 
and includes questions about making ends meet and financial difficulty. A lower 
score indicates more economic strain. The household goods ownership scale is a 
count of common “big-ticket” household goods a respondent owns such as refrig-
erator, washing machine, and dryer. A higher score indicates the ownership of 
more items.
Three scales probe the connection between respondents and their communities. 
The “getting help” scale is a count of types of help such as child care, food support, 
and emotional support from friends and neighbors. Higher values represent more 
utilization of support. The “giving help” scale asks about the same set of items but 
about the respondent providing the types of assistance. Again, higher values rep-
resent the provision of more types of help. The community involvement measures 
the respondent’s participation in community activities like fundraisers, politics, and 
neighborhood organizations. Respondents who report participating more fully in 
their communities will have a higher score on this scale.
Home value and home debt were self reported at wave-4 by respondents who 
owned a home at that wave. For home value, respondents were asked how much 
they thought their home would sell for on the day of the interview. For respondents 
who report owning multiple homes, home value represents the sum of all estimated 
home values. Home debt is the sum of the amount the respondent reports as owed 
on outstanding home mortgage loans. Respondents reported debt associated with 
each loan individually. Home equity is the simple difference between home value 
and home debt.
The mortgage characteristics reported in Table 8 come from self-reports by those 
identified as mortgage holders at wave-4. Respondents who held multiple mort-
gages were asked to identify their largest mortgage, which is analyzed in Table 10. 
Respondents were asked to report whether that mortgage had a fixed rate and the 
current interest rate on the loan.
Questions regarding the loan performance outcomes in Table 8 were asked of 
all respondents who reported owning a home at any point between their baseline 
interview and their wave-4 interview. Respondents self-reported whether they had 
ever been 30 or 90 days late on mortgage payments. Among those who had ever 
owned since baseline and who reported leaving an owned home, respondents were 
asked the circumstances of their leaving each home, including whether they sold the 
home or a bank or mortgage company foreclosed on the home. Any respondent who 
reported ever having been foreclosed upon was included in the foreclosed category.
VOL. 5 NO. 1 143Grinstein-Weiss et al.: individual development accounts
REFERENCES
Administration for Children and Families, Office of Community Services. 2010. “Report to Congress: 
Assets for Independence Program: Status at the Conclusion of the Ninth Year.” US Department of 
Health and Human Services. Washington, DC, December. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/
afi/Final_AFI_9th_Report.pdf.
Almond, Douglas, and Janet Currie. 2011. “Human Capital Development Before Age Five.” In Hand-
book of Labor Economics, Vol. 4B, edited by Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, 1315–1486. 
Amsterdam: Elsevier.
American Community Survey. 2007. Tulsa county, Oklahoma. median Value (Dollars), universe: 
Owner-Occupied Housing units Table B25077. United States Census Bureau. Washington, 
DC, November. http://factfinder2.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml? 
pid=ACS_07_1YR_B25077&prodType=table.
Ard, Owen S., and David Puckett. 2002. “Tulsa County Residential Housing Market Analysis.” 
 Unpublished.
Ashraf, Nava, Dean Karlan, and Wesley Yin. 2006. “Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a 
Commitment Savings Product in the Philippines.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (2): 635–72.
Biemer, Paul P., Robert M. Groves, Lars E. Lyberg, Nancy A. Mathiowetz, and Seymour Sudman, eds. 
1991. measurement Errors in Surveys. New York: Wiley.
Bostic, Raphael W., and Kwan Ok Lee. 2008. “Mortgages, Risk, and Homeownership among Low- and 
Moderate-Income Families.” American Economic review 98 (2): 310–14. 
Chetty, Raj, John N. Friedman, Nathaniel Hilger, Emmanuel Saez, Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, 
and Danny Yagan. 2011. “How Does Your Kindergarten Classroom Affect Your Earnings? Evi-
dence from Project Star.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (2): 749–804.
Conger, Rand D., Lora Ebert Wallace, Yumei Sun, Ronald L. Simons, Vonnie C. McLoyd, and Gene H. 
Brody. 2002. “Economic Pressure in African American Families: A Replication and Extension of 
the Family Stress Model.” Developmental Psychology 38 (2): 179–93.
Deshpande, Rani, and Jamie M. Zimmerman, eds. 2010. “Youth Savings in Developing Countries: 
Trends in Practice, Gaps in Knowledge.” Paper presented at YouthSave Consortium. St. Louis, May 
6. http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/Documents/YouthSavingsMay2010.pdf.
Dietz, Robert D., and Donald R. Haurin. 2003. “The Social and Private Micro-Level Consequences of 
Homeownership.” Journal of urban Economics 54 (3): 401–50.
Duflo, Esther, William Gale, Jeffrey Liebman, Peter Orszag, and Emmanuel Saez. 2006. “Saving 
Incentives for Low- and Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R 
Block.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 121 (4): 1311–46.
Engelhardt, Gary V. 1996. “Tax Subsidies and Household Saving: Evidence from Canada.” Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 111 (4): 1237–68.
Engelhardt, Gary V. 1997. “Do Targeted Saving Incentives for Homeownership Work? The Canadian 
Experience.” Journal of Housing research 8 (2): 225–48.
 Engelhardt, Gary V., and Anil Kumar. 2007. “Employer Matching and 401(k) Saving: Evidence from 
the Health and Retirement Study.” Journal of Public Economics 91 (10): 1920–43.
Engelhardt, Gary V., Alissa L. Dubnicki, Ellen L. Marks, and Bryan B. Rhodes. 2011. “Educational 
Saving Incentives for Low-Income Families: Experimental Evidence from the Michigan SEED 
Program.” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1946456.
Engelhardt, Gary V., Michael D. Eriksen, William G. Gale, and Gregory B. Mills. 2010. “What Are the 
Social Benefits of Homeownership? Experimental Evidence for Low-Income Households.” Journal 
of urban Economics 67 (3): 249–58.
Engen, Eric M., William G. Gale, and John Karl Scholz. 1996. “The Illusory Effects of Saving Incen-
tives on Saving.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (4): 113–38.
Grinstein-Weiss, Michal, Jung-Sook Lee, Johanna K. P. Greeson, Chang-Keun Han, Yeong H. Yeo, 
and Kate Irish. 2008. “Fostering Low-Income Homeownership through Individual Development 
Accounts: A Longitudinal, Randomized Experiment.” Housing Policy Debate 19 (4): 711–39.
Grinstein-Weiss, Michal, Michael Sherraden, William G. Gale, William M. Rohe, Mark Schreiner, and 
Clinton Key. 2013. “Long-Term Impacts of Individual Development Accounts on Homeownership 
among Baseline Renters: Follow-Up Evidence from a Randomized Experiment: Dataset.” Ameri-
can Economic Journal: Economic Policy. http://dx.doi.org/10.1257/pol.5.1.122.
Grinstein-Weiss, Michal, Michael Sherraden, William G. Gale, William M. Rohe, Mark Schreiner, 
and Clinton Key. 2011. “Ten-Year Impacts of Individual Development Accounts on Homeowner-
ship: Evidence from a Randomized Experiment.” http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_
id=1782018 (accessed November 26, 2012).
144 AmErIcAN EcONOmIc JOurNAL: EcONOmIc POLIcy FEBruAry 2013
Guo, Shenyang, and Mark W. Fraser. 2010. Propensity Score Analysis: Statistical methods and Appli-
cations. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Hall, Robert E. 1988. “Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption.” Journal of Political Economy 96 
(2): 339–57.
Han, Chang-Keun, Michal Grinstein-Weiss, and Michael Sherraden. 2009. “Assets beyond Savings in 
Individual Development Accounts.” Social Service review 83 (2): 221–44.
Herbert, Christopher E., and Eric S. Belsky. 2008. “Symposium: Homeownership Experience of Low-
Income and Minority Households: A Review and Synthesis of the Literature.” cityscape: A Journal 
of Policy Development and research 10 (2): 5–60. 
Hirano, Keisuke, and Guido W. Imbens. 2001. “Estimation of Causal Effects Using Propensity Score 
Weighting: An Application to Data on Right Heart Catheterization.” Health Services and Outcomes 
research methodology 2 (3–4): 259–78.
Hotz, V. Joseph, Guido W. Imbens, and Jacob A. Klerman. 2006. “Evaluating the Differential Effects 
of Alternative Welfare-to-Work Training Components: A Real Analysis of the California GAIN 
Program.” Journal of Labor Economics 24 (3): 521–66.
Hurst, Eric, and James P. Ziliak. 2006. “Do Welfare Asset Limits Affect Household Savings? Evidence 
from Welfare Reform.” Journal of Human resources 41 (1): 46–71.
Leckie, Norm, Taylor Shek-Wai Hui, Doug Tattrie, Jennifer Robson, and Jean-Pierre Voyer. 2010. 
Learn$ave Individual Development Accounts Project: Final report. Social Research and 
Demonstration Corporation. Ottawa, November. http://www.srdc.org/uploads/learnSave_final_
EN.pdf.
Loke, Vernon, and Michael Sherraden. 2009. “Building Assets from Birth: A Global Comparison of 
Child Development Account Policies.” International Journal of Social Welfare 18 (2): 119–29.
McKernan, Signe-Mary, Caroline Ratcliffe, and Yunju Nam. 2007. The Effects of Welfare and IDA 
Program rules on the Asset Holdings of Low-Income Families. US Department of Health and 
Human Services Report Series: Poor Finances: Assets and Low-Income. St. Louis, September. 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/hsp/07/PoorFinances/assets/report.pdf.
McKernan, Signe-Mary, and Michael Sherraden, eds. 2008. Asset Building and Low-Income Families. 
Washington, DC: Urban Institute Press.
Mills, Gregory, Ken Lam, Donna DeMarco, Christopher Rodger, and Bulbul Kaul. 2008. Assets for 
Independence Act Evaluation Impact Study: Final report. Abt Associates. Cambridge, MA, Febru-
ary. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/afi/AFI_Final_Impact_Report.pdf.
Mills, Gregory, William G. Gale, Rhiannon Patterson, Gary V. Engelhardt, Michael D. Eriksen, and 
Emil Apostolov. 2008. “Effects of Individual Development Accounts on Asset Purchases and Sav-
ing Behavior: Evidence from a Controlled Experiment.” Journal of Public Economics 92 (5–6): 
1509–30.
Mills, Gregory, Rhiannon Patterson, Larry Orr, and Donna DeMarco. 2004. Evaluation of the Ameri-
can Dream Demonstration: Final Evaluation report. Abt Associates Inc. Cambridge, MA, August. 
http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/Documents/Abt_ADD_Final_Report.pdf.
Moser, Caroline, and Anis A. Dani, eds. 2008. Assets, Livelihoods, and Social Policy, New Frontiers of 
Social Policy. Washington, DC: World Bank. 
National Association of Realtors. 2009. Tulsa Area Local market report, Fourth Quarter 2009. Na-
tional Association of Realtors. Chicago. 
Office of Management and Budget. 2011. Budget of the united States Government, Fy 2012: Analyti-
cal Perspectives. US Government Printing Office (GPO). Washington, DC, December. http://www.
whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2012/assets/spec.pdf.
Oliver, Melvin L., and Thomas M. Shapiro. 2006. Black Wealth/White Wealth. 2nd ed. New York: 
Routledge.
Orr, Larry L. 1999. Social Experiments: Evaluating Public Programs with Experimental methods. 
Thousand Oaks: Sage.
Oyserman, Daphna, and Mesmin Destin. 2010. “Identity-Based Motivation: Implications for Inter-
vention.” counseling Psychologist 38 (7): 1001–43.
Poterba, James M., Steven F. Venti, and David A. Wise. 1996. “How Retirement Saving Programs 
Increase Saving.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 10 (4): 91–112.
Rademacher, Ida, Kasey Wiedrich, Signe-Mary McKernan, Caroline Ratcliffe, and Megan Gallagher. 
2010. “Weathering the Storm: Have IDAs Helped Low-Income Homebuyers Avoid Foreclosure?” 
Corporation for Enterprise Development (CFED). http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/412064_
weathering_the_storm.pdf (accessed November 26, 2012).
Rosenbaum, Paul R. 2002. “Covariance Adjustment in Randomized Experiments and Observational 
Studies.” Statistical Science 17 (3): 286–327.
VOL. 5 NO. 1 145Grinstein-Weiss et al.: individual development accounts
Saez, Emmanuel. 2009. “Details Matter: The Impact of Presentation and Information on the Take-Up 
of Financial Incentives for Retirement Saving.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 1 
(1): 204–28.
Scholz, John Karl, and Ananth Seshadri. 2009. “The Assets and Liabilities Held By Low-Income 
Households.” In Insufficient Funds: Savings, Assets, credit, and Banking among Low-Income 
Households, edited by Rebecca M. Blank and Michael S. Barr, 25–65. National Poverty Center 
Series on Poverty and Public Policy. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Schreiner, Mark. 2006. “Program Costs for Individual Development Accounts: Final Figures from 
CAPTC in Tulsa.” Savings and Development 30 (3): 247–74. 
Schreiner, Mark, Margaret Clancy, and Michael Sherraden. 2002. Final report: Saving Performance 
in the American Dream Demonstration: A National Demonstration of Individual Development 
Accounts. Center for Social Development. St. Louis, October. http://csd.wustl.edu/Publications/
Documents/ADDReport2002.pdf.
Schreiner, Mark, and Michael Sherraden. 2007. can the Poor Save? Saving and Asset Building in 
Individual Development Accounts. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers.
Seidman, Laurence S. 2001. “Assets and the Tax Code.” In Assets for the Poor: The Benefits of 
 Spreading Asset Ownership, edited by Thomas M. Shapiro and Edward N. Wolff, 324–56. New 
York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Shapiro, Thomas M. 2004. The Hidden cost of Being African American: How Wealth Perpetuates 
Inequality. New York: Oxford University Press.
Sherraden, Margaret S., and Amanda Moore McBride. 2010. Striving to Save: creating Policies for 
Financial Security of Low-Income Families. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Sherraden, Margaret S., Amanda Moore McBride, Stacie Hanson, and Lissa Johnson. 2005. “Short 
Term and Long-Term Savings in Low Income Households: Evidence from Individual Development 
Accounts.” Journal of Income Distribution 13 (3–4): 76–97.
Sherraden, Michael. 1991. Assets and the Poor: A New American Welfare Policy. Armonk: M. E. 
Sharpe.
Sherraden, Michael. 2001. “Asset-Building Policy and Programs for the Poor.” In Assets for the Poor: 
The Benefits of Spreading Asset Ownership, edited by Thomas M. Shapiro and Edward N. Wolff, 
302–33. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Tulsa Housing Authority. 2008. “Options for Homeownership.” http://www.tulsahousing.org/Housin-
gOptions/Homeownership/tabid/60/Default.aspx (accessed November 26, 2012).
US Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of 
Community Services. 2010. report to congress: Assets for Independence Program: Status at the 
conclusion of the Ninth year. http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ocs/afi/Final_AFI_9th_Report.pdf (accessed November 26, 2012).
Wolff, Edward N. 2001. “Recent Trends in Wealth Ownership, from 1983 to 1998.” In Assets for the 
Poor: The Benefits of Spreading Asset Ownership, edited by Thomas M. Shapiro and Edward N. 
Wolff, 34–73. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
Woo, Lillian G., F. William Schweke, and David E. Buchholz. 2004. Hidden in Plain Sight: A Look 
at the $335 Billion Federal Asset-Building Budget. Corporation for Enterprise Development. 
 Washington, DC, Spring. http://content.knowledgeplex.org/kp2/cache/kp/24095.pdf.
